How should financial intermediation services be taxed? by Lockwood, Ben
  
 
 
How Should Financial Intermediation Services be
Taxed?¤
Ben Lockwoody
First version: May 31 2010
This version: 30 September 2013
Abstract
This paper considers the optimal taxation of savings intermediation services in
a dynamic general equilibrium setting, when the government can also use consump-
tion, income and pro…t taxes. When 100% taxation of pro…t is available, taxes on
services supplied to …rms should be deductible from pro…t, implying the optimality
of a VAT-type tax. As for the rate of tax, in the steady state, an optimal arrange-
ment is to set it equal to the rate of tax on capital income, not consumption. In
turn, the capital income tax is zero when the when an unrestricted pro…t tax is
available, but in the more realistic case when such a tax is not available, this rate
can be positive or negative, but generally di¤erent to the optimal rate of tax on
consumption.
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1. Introduction
Financial intermediation services include such important services as intermediation be-
tween borrowers and lenders, insurance, and payment services (e.g. credit and debit card
services). These services comprise a signi…cant and growing part of the national economy.
For example, …nancial intermediation services as conventionally de…ned in the national
accounts includes activities such as the taking of deposits and the granting of credit,
…nancial leasing, investment in securities and properties by …nancial intermediaries, in-
surance and pension funding, and services ancillary to …nancial intermediation1. The EU
KLEMS database shows that this sector comprised 6.5% of national output in the UK in
1997, increasing to 7.9% by 2007. The …gures for the US, using the same de…nition of
…nancial intermediation services, are 7.3% in 1997, rising to 8.6% and for the Eurozone,
4.8%, rising to 5.3%2. Even excluding insurance - which is beyond the scope of this paper
- …nancial intermediation is quantitatively important in OECD countries3.
The question of whether, and how, …nancial intermediation services should be taxed
is a contentious one4. For example, within European Union countries, most …nancial
services are currently exempt from VAT, and there is considerable debate about the
possible bene…ts from bringing them into the VAT system (de la Feria and Lockwood
(2010)). Also, the recent IMF proposals for a "bank tax" to cover the cost of government
interventions in the banking system include a Financial Activities Tax levied on bank
pro…ts and remuneration, one version of which - FAT1 - which would work very much like
a VAT, levied using the addition method (IMF(2010)).
In the policy literature on this topic, it is largely assumed that within a consump-
tion tax system, such as a VAT, it is desirable to tax …nancial services supplied at the
standard rate of VAT, and allow providers of intermediation services to claim back VAT
they pay on inputs: see e.g. Ebril, Keen, Bodin, and Summers(2001)). However, this
policy prescription is at variance with a small academic literature on this topic (Grubert
and Mackie(1999), Jack(1999), and Boadway and Keen(2003)), which suggests that while
1Financial intermediation comprises activities 65,66,67 in the ISIC/NACE system of national accounts.
The de…nition of these activities can be found for example, in the handbook NACE: REV.1, published
by Eurostat.
2Authors’ calculations: …nancial intermediation comprises lines J65-67 in the EU KLEMS Growth
and Productivity Accounts (http://www.euklems.net/index.html).
3Data showing the size of intermediation services relating to the taking of deposits and granting of
credit only are presented for the UK in Section 1.2 below.
4There are technical di¢culties in taxing …nancial intermediation services; however, these di¢culties
are not insurmountable - see Section 1.1 below.
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payment services should be taxed at the same rate as consumption, intermediation be-
tween borrower and lender should not be taxed at all. However, this literature is based on
…rst-best arguments i.e. …nding the tax arrangement that does not drive a wedge between
the household marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation in
production.
The objective of this paper is to take a fresh look at this question, from a tax design
point of view. Our focus on the most important intermediation service - intermediation
between borrowers and lenders5. We set up and solve the tax design problem in a dynamic
general equilibrium model of the Chamley(1986) type, where the government chooses a
tax on savings intermediation, as well as the usual taxes on consumption (or equivalently,
wage income) and income from capital, to …nance a public good, and where …nancial
intermediaries, in the form of banks, are explicitly modelled. Realistically, we assume
that savings intermediation is not explicitly priced, but charged for via a spread between
borrowing and lending rates set by competitive banks. This spread can be taxed, at a rate
that may be di¤erent from the tax on consumption, and the tax system is parameterized
so that some fraction  of the tax paid by …rms on …nancial intermediation inputs can be
credited against the consumption tax changed by …rms. In the case of a VAT,  = 1
The main results are as follows. First, the tax paid by …rms on …nancial intermediation
inputs should be fully credited i.e. the tax should be a VAT, when 100% taxation of pro…t
is possible6. This is an example of the general Diamond-Mirrlees production e¢ciency
result that intermediate inputs should not be taxed under these conditions. But, at what
rate should the VAT be set? Here, there are two main …ndings. First, the optimal tax
structure is indeterminate, because the government has two instruments, a capital income
tax and a …nancial intermediation tax, to control the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption in successive periods. However, it turns out that from an informational point
of view, the simplest optimal tax structure is where capital income tax and a …nancial
intermediation tax are equal.
In particular, when 100% taxation of pure pro…t is possible, the simplest optimal tax
structure is to set both the tax rate on capital income, and the tax rate on …nancial
intermediation services equal to zero. In the more realistic case when there is an upper
bound on the rate of pro…t of less than 100%, we show that a simple optimal tax structure
is again to set the two taxes at the same rate. The sign of this common rate then depends
5I study taxation of payment services in a companion paper, Lockwood and Yerushalmi(2013).
6Firms must make pure pro…t in equilibrium, because they must have decreasing returns, in turn
because they possibly face di¤erent borrowing costs.
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on the properties of the production function; it can be positive or negative. Moreover,
this common rate is generally di¤erent from the optimal tax rate on consumption.
These results are quite di¤erent from the existing literature (see Section 1.2) which
generally …nds that …nancial intermediation services should be untaxed. However, these
are …rst-best models, where there is (implicitly) no revenue requirement. There, the
optimality of leaving …nancial intermediation services untaxed is derived just from the
condition that the marginal rate of substitution in consumption is equal to the marginal
rate of transformation. Our results also di¤er from Auerbach and Gordon(2002), which
…nds, using a rather di¤erent argument, that …nancial intermediation services should be
taxed at the same rate as consumption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 discusses some basic
facts about the taxation of …nancial intermediation, and Section 1.2 discusses related
literature. Section 2 outlines the model and Section 3 presents the main results. Section
4 considers the case without 100% pro…t taxation, Section 5 considers other extensions,
and Section 6 concludes.
1.1. The Size and Tax Treatment of Financial Intermediation Services
The …gures quoted at the beginning of the paper measure the overall size of the …nancial
intermediation sector. To get an idea of the value of …nancial intermediation associated
with the taking of deposits and the grant of credit only, we can look at FISIM7. FISIM
is computed from the transactions between the banking sector and other sectors of the
economy (for example, non-…nancial …rms and households). For each of these sectors,
the loans from, and deposits with, the banking sector, are measured and the margins
made by the banking sector on these activities are calculated. Speci…cally, the margin per
currency unit deposited is a reference rate minus the average rate of interest on deposits,
and the margin per currency unit lent is the average rate of interest on loans, minus a
reference rate (Akritidis(2007)). So, FISIM can be calculated by sector, and also on loans
and deposits separately. As our focus is primarily on taxation of the household sector, we
show consumption of FISIM by households and non-pro…t institutions serving households
for the UK over the period 1997 to 2012.
7This is an acronym for "…nancial intermediation services indirectly measured".
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Figure 1: FISIM Consumed by Households as a
Percentage of Household Consumption Expenditure, UK
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Source: O¢ce of National Statistics, UK. The chart shows FISIM on loans (series IV8X)
and deposits (series IV8W) consumed by households and non-pro…t institutions
serving households as a percentage of aggregate consumption (series RPQM)
This shows that consumption of FISIM by households is between 3% and 4% of total
household expenditure in the UK over this period; not large, but not a negligible fraction,
either. Also the …nancial crisis has had as positive impact on this …gure, as banks have
increased their spreads on loans to repair their balance sheets. So, overall, it can be seen
that …nancial intermediation services are a signi…cant and growing part of the economy
in the UK. The picture is the same for other OECD countries with a developed …nancial
sector.
As regards the taxation of …nancial intermediation services, in our theoretical analysis
below, we assume that intermediation services can be taxed; speci…cally, that banks can
charge taxes to households and …rms separately on their consumption of intermediation
services. It is recognized that in practice there are technical di¢culties when those services
are not explicitly priced (so-called margin-based services), because it is not straightforward
to divide the "value-added" between borrower and lender. In particular, this raises a
problem for the use of a VAT via the usual invoice-credit method (Ebril, Keen, Bodin
and Summers(2001)). As a result, the status quo in most countries is that a wide range
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of …nancial intermediation services are not taxed. For example, in the EU, many such
services are exempt as a result of the 6th VAT directive8.
However, conceptually, the problems can be solved in several di¤erent ways. One
administratively straightforward system would be to zero-rate sales to VAT-registered
entities and tax sales to non-registered entities e.g. households on an aggregate basis
(Huizinga(2002)). Alternatively, Poddar and English(1997) have proposed a cash-‡ow
VAT with tax calculation accounts; this is administratively more complex, but the increas-
ing sophistication of banks’ IT systems means that this solution is becoming practical. A
recent study by the European Commission calculates that EU-27 tax revenue might rise
by around £15 billion Euro if intermediation services were brought into the VAT system,
and taxed at the standard rate (European Commission(2011)).
1.2. Related Literature
There is a small literature directly addressing the optimal taxation of borrower-lender
intermediation and payment services, Grubert and Mackie(1999), Jack(1999), and Boad-
way and Keen(2003). Using a simple two-period consumption-savings model, these papers
agree on a policy prescription9. Given a consumption tax that is uniform over time, pay-
ment services should be taxed at this uniform rate, but savings intermediation should be
left untaxed. The argument used to establish this is simple; in a two-period consumption-
savings model with the same, exogenously …xed, tax on consumption in both periods,
this arrangement leaves the marginal rate of substitution between current and future con-
sumption undistorted i.e. equal to the marginal rate of transformation in production.
Using a di¤erent approach, Auerbach and Gordon (2002) do not make a sharp distinc-
tion between payment services and savings intermediation, and argue that both activities
should be taxed at the same rate as consumption10. More precisely, they show that a
wage tax is equivalent to a uniform tax on consumption and intermediation services.
8The Sixth VAT Directive and subsequent legislation exempts a wide range of …nancial services from
VAT, including insurance and reinsurance transactions, the granting and the negotiation of credit, trans-
actions concerning deposit and current accounts, payments, transfers, debts, cheques, currency, bank
notes and coins used as legal tender etc. (Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006, Article
135).
9Chia and Whalley(1999), using a computational approach, reach the rather di¤erent conclusion that
payment services should be untaxed, but but their model is not directly comparable to these others, as
the intermediation costs are assemed to be proportional to the price of the goods being transacted.
10Auerbach and Gordon(2002) state: "transactions costs can include the real resources ...lost when
investing these funds so that they will be available in a later period" (Auerbach and Gordon(2002),
p412).
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However, one can make three criticisms of this literature. First, taxes are taken as
given. In particular, consumption taxes are assumed equal in both periods, and capital
income taxes are set to zero. Combined with the (implicit) assumption of …xed labour
supply in those models11, the tax system (other than taxes on …nancial services) amounts
to a non-distortionary tax on labour income. In this setting, it is of course, optimal
for marginal rate of substitution in consumption to be equal to the marginal rate of
transformation in production. It is then not very surprising that the tax on borrower-
lender intermediation should be zero. Second, as taxes are not distortionary, there is no
second-best tax design problem, so the question of trading o¤ distortions generated by
a tax on …nancial services against other distortionary taxes does not arise. Third, the
production side of the economy is not explicitly modelled, so that questions of distortions
in input prices caused by taxes on …nancial services cannot be addressed.
Second, there is also a less closely related literature on the use of taxation to control
"bad banks". The idea here is that while banks may engage in socially undesirable activ-
ities on both lending and deposit-taking margins, these should be corrected by Pigouvian
taxes (or regulations) that apply directly to these decision margins. There has recently
been surge of literature on such Pigouvian taxes; see e.g. Acharya et. al.(2010), Bianchi
and Mendoza(2010), Keen(2010), Perrotti and Suarez(2011), Coulter, Mayer, and Vick-
ers(2012). In our model, banks are merely producers that price intermediation services
at marginal cost, so there is no role for Pigouvian taxes.
2. The Model
2.1. Households
The model is a version of Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe(1999) with savings intermediation
by banks added to the basic structure. There is a single in…nitely lived household with
preferences over levels of a single consumption-capital good, leisure, and a public good in
each period  = 0 1 of the form
1X
=0
(( ) + ()) (2.1)
where  is the level of consumption in period   2 [0 1] is the supply of labour hours,
and  is public good provision. Utility ( ) is strictly increasing in  strictly decreasing
11The exception here is Auerbach and Gordon(2002), where labour supply is variable. However, in
their model, the consumption tax is just assumed to be uniform, not optimised.
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in  and strictly concave, and () is strictly increasing and strictly concave in  Finally,
0    1 is a discount factor.
In any period  the household is assumed to pay an ad valorem tax   on  and also
pays proportional taxes on labour and capital income. Using the well-known fact that
a consumption tax is equivalent to a wage tax, we assume w.l.o.g. that the wage tax is
zero Finally, for the moment, we suppose that the household has no pro…t income in any
period: …rms generate pure pro…ts (for reasons explained in Section 3.2 below), but these
are taxed at 100%. So, in any period, the budget constraint is
(1 + 

) + +1 =  + (1 + )
where  is the post-tax return to the household on savings, and  is the wage, and +1
is savings. Finally,  = (1 ¡   )  where  is the pre-tax return on savings for the
household, determined below, and   is the capital income tax.
So, following Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe(1999), the present value budget constraint of
the household can be obtained by aggregating over per-period budget constraints:
1X
=0
((1 + 

) + +1) =
1X
=0
( + (1 + )) (2.2)
where  is the price of output in period  We normalize by setting 0 = 1 and assume
for convenience that 0 = 0 i.e. initial capital is zero12 The …rst-order conditions for a
maximum of (2.1) subject to (2.2) with respect to   +1 respectively are:
 = (1 + 

) (2.3)
¡ =  (2.4)
 = (1 + +1)+1 (2.5)
where  is the multiplier on (2.2), and we use (here and below) the notation that for
any any function (  ) , the partial derivative of  with respect to  is  the
cross-derivative is  etc.
2.2. Banks
For simplicity, we assume 100% depreciation of the capital good. So, in the standard
version of this model, without …nancial intermediation, the household provides  units of
12This implies that the government cannot set a …rst-period capital levy on …xed capital 0 and thus
simpli…es the analysis (see Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe(1999)).
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the consumption-capital good to the …rms in period ¡ 1, and …rms (in aggregate) repay
the  units of consumption-capital good to the household in period  plus interest In
our version of the model, the  units of the consumption-capital good are deposited with
a bank at  ¡ 1 who can then provide this stock  to …rms as an input to production.
The …rms then repay  to the bank at , plus interest, and …nally, the bank repays  to
the households, plus interest.
The cost of intermediating one unit of savings between the household and …rm  is ~
units of labour. Note that we take ~ as …xed, but possibly varying between …rms. This
is realistic; lending is a complex process involving initial assessment of the borrower via
e.g. credit scoring, structuring and pricing the loan, and monitoring compliance with loan
covenants (Gup and Kolari(2005, chapter 9).
We also suppose that the total intermediation cost ~ can be divided by the bank
between the cost of services provided to the household,  (e.g. safekeeping of deposits,
liquidity) and cost of services provided to …rm  (e.g. monitoring),  i.e. ~ =  +
. This is a realistic assumption, because in practice, any scheme (such as the tax
calculation accounts of Poddar and English(1997)) which implements a VAT on margin-
based …nancial intermediation services must split the "value-added" between borrower
and lender. We assume that banks can borrow and lend at a "pure" rate of interest 
which will eventually be determined in equilibrium in the capital market. Finally, we
assume that banks are perfectly competitive, which combined with the constant returns
intermediation technology, implies that they make zero pro…t in equilibrium.
Finally, we assume that a tax on intermediation services, or spread tax, is in oper-
ation at rate    which can be di¤erent from the rate 

 on …nal consumption. Banks
must break even on each of the two activities of providing services to households, and
to …rms separately, otherwise a competitor bank could pro…tably undercut them. So,
in equilibrium, the costs of intermediation   plus the tax paid, are equal to the
spreads  ¡   ¡  respectively, where  is the rate at which …rm  borrows, and 
is the rate of return on savings for the household. That is:
 ¡  = (1 +  )  ¡  = (1 +  ) (2.6)
This is intuitive: the spread on both borrowing and lending is equal to the real resource
cost plus by the tax.
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2.3. Firms
There are …rms  = 1  which produce the homogenous consumption good in each pe-
riod13 Firm  produces output from labour and capital via the strictly concave production
function  ( 

) where 

 

 are capital and labour inputs
14. Because …rms may di¤er
in intermediation costs  …rms face di¤erences in the cost of capital i.e. …rm  must
repay 1 +  per unit of capital borrowed from the bank. So, the pro…t of …rm  is
 ( 

)¡  ¡ (1 + ) +  
where  
 is the total tax paid on intermediation services by the …rm, and 
 is the
fraction of the tax paid on intermediation services that the …rm can claim against the
tax paid on output. Of course, in the usual VAT system,  = 1 So, substituting  from
(2.6) pro…t can be written
 ( 

)¡  ¡ (1 +  + (1 + (1¡ ) )) (2.7)
Maximizing (2.7) with respect to  

 implies the …rst-order conditions:
  (

 

) =  

(

 

) = 1 + ~

 (2.8)
where ~ =  + 
(1 + (1 ¡ ) ) is the cost of capital for …rm  Finally, the capital
and labour market clearing conditions are:
X
=1
 = 
X
=1
 + 
 +
X
=1

 =  (2.9)
These conditions (2.8),(2.9) jointly determine  and , given household savings and
labour supply decisions.
2.4. Discussion
The above model provides a general framework which encompasses some aspects of the
speci…c models of taxation of …nancial services (Auerbach and Gordon(2002), Boadway
and Keen(2003)), Jack(1999), Grubert and Mackie(1999)) that have been developed so
13We also assume for convenience that one unit of the consumption good can be transformed into one
unit of the public good. This …xes the relative pre-tax price of  and  at unity.
14We assume that …rms face decreasing returns, because with di¤erent costs of capital, and the same
wage, with constant returns, only the one …rm with the lowest unit cost would operate, and this case is
of limited interest.
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far. Speci…cally, ignoring payment services, which are not dealt with in this paper, Boad-
way and Keen(2003)), Jack(1999), Grubert and Mackie(1999) are two-period versions of
the above model15, with …xed taxes and (implicitly) …xed labour supply. Auerbach and
Gordon(2002) is a …nite-horizon version of the model, with the additional feature16 that
there are  consumption goods in each period. Payment services are dealt with in a
companion paper, Lockwood and Yerushalmi(2013).
3. Tax Design
We take a primal approach to the tax design problem. In this approach, an optimal
policy for the government is a choice of all the primal variables in the model, in this case©
  +1  (

 

)

=1
ª1
=0
to maximize utility (2.1) subject to the capital and labour
market clearing conditions (2.9), aggregate resource, and implementability constraints.
We are thus assuming, following Chamley(1986), that the government can pre-commit to
a policy at  = 0 The aggregate resource constraint says that total production must equal
to the sum of the uses to which that production is put:
 + +1 +  =
X
=1
 ( 

)  = 0 1  (3.1)
The implementability constraint ensures that the government’s choices also solve the
household optimization problem, and is in our model, quite standard. We obtain it
by substituting the household’s …rst-order conditions (2.3)-(2.5) in (2.2). After some
rearrangement, this gives the condition:
1X
=0
( + ) = 0 (3.2)
As is standard in the primal approach to tax design, we can incorporate the imple-
mentability constraint (3.2) into the government’s maximand by writing
 = ( ) + () + ( + ) (3.3)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on (3.2). If  · 0 i.e. consumption and leisure are
complements, it is possible to show that  ¸ 0 at the solution to this tax design problem
15A minor quali…cation here is that Boadway and Keen allow for a …xed cost of savings intermediation
e.g. …xed costs of opening a savings account. These introduce a non-convexity into household decision-
making, which greatly complicates the optimal tax problem, and so we abstract from these in this paper.
16It also has labour supply in only one period.
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(see Appendix). If  = 0 the revenue from pro…t taxation is su¢cient to fund the public
good,  We will rule out this uninteresting case, and so will assume that   0 at the
optimum in what follows
The government’s choice of primal variables must maximize
P1
=0 
 subject to (3.1)
and (2.9). The …rst-order conditions with respect to       are, respectively;
 =   (3.4)
¡ =   (3.5)
 =  ¡1 + 


 (3.6)
 =   (3.7)
 

 = 

 + 


  = 1  (3.8)


 = 

  = 1  (3.9)
where   

  

 are the multipliers on the resource constraint and the capital and labour
market clearing conditions at time  respectively.
Moreover, from (3.3),
 = (1 + (1 +))  =
 + 

(3.10)
and
 =  (1 + (1 +))  =
 + 

(3.11)
Here,   are given by standard formulae found, for example, in the primal approach
to the static tax design problem (Atkinson and Stiglitz(1980)). In particular, ¡  0
under our assumption  · 0 and its magnitude measures the degree of complementarity
between consumption and leisure.
We begin by characterizing the rate of tax on the consumption good via the following
result, which is proved in the Appendix:
Proposition 1. At any date  = 0 1 2 the optimal tax on …nal consumption in ad
valorem form is
 
1 +  
=
µ
 ¡ 

¶µ
 ¡
1 +
¶
  = ¡

(3.12)
Note that (3.12) is a formula for an optimal consumption tax that also occurs in the
static optimal tax problem, when the primal approach is used (Atkinson and Stiglitz(1980,
p377). In particular,  is the marginal bene…t of $1 to the government, and  is a
measure of the marginal utility of $1 to the household, so ¡

is a measure of the social
gain from additional taxation at the margin. It says that other things equal, the higher
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the degree of complementarity between consumption and leisure, ¡ the higher is   
Note also that by our assumption that  · 0   0
Now we turn to consider the question of whether tax paid on …nancial intermediation
should be deductible by …rms i.e. the choice of  From (3.8),(3.9), we see that the
marginal rate of substitution between labour and capital is
 
 
=

 
+  (3.13)
which implies that
 
 
¡ 


 
=  ¡  (3.14)
However, from the …rst-order conditions for the …rm, (2.8), we see that
 
 
=
1 + 

+ (1 + (1¡ ) ) (3.15)
which implies that
 
 
¡ 


 
= ( ¡ )(1 + (1¡ ) ) (3.16)
If  6=   and   6= 0 equations (3.14),(3.16) can only hold simultaneously if  = 1 So,
we have shown:
Proposition 2. If there is heterogeneity in intermediation costs, ( 6=   some  ) and
the rate of tax on …nancial services   6= 0 then any date  e¢ciency requires  = 1 i.e.
full deductibility of   by …rms.
The intuition for this result is clear. Equation (3.14) says that the marginal product
of capital net of true intermediation costs should be equal across …rms, which of course is
just the condition for capital to be allocated e¢ciently across …rms. But, condition (3.14)
is generally not consistent with a non-zero   when …rms are heterogenous. This is just
an instance of the Diamond-Mirrlees production e¢ciency theorem. A tax on the bank
margin is an intermediate tax on the allocation of capital, and given our assumptions (a
full set of tax instruments, and no pure pro…ts), this tax should be set to zero. Note
also that when there is only one …rm, this argument has no bite, and thus  is left
indeterminate.
We now turn to the question of how the taxes on capital income,   and on inter-
mediation services,    should be set. Generally, it can be shown, by straightforward
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manipulation of the …rst-order conditions to the optimal tax problem and the household
and …rm problems, that:
Proposition 3. At all dates  = 1 2      solve

¡
1 +  ¡ 
¢
= 1 + (1¡   )( ¡ (1 +  )) (3.17)
where  =
1+(1+)
1+(1+¡1)
1+
1+¡1

The proof of this is in the Appendix. Clearly,    

 are not uniquely determined
from this single condition. Ultimately, this is because the planner has two instruments,
   

  for controlling the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at  and
+1 However, we can use the following criterion to choose between solutions. Say that a
solution    

 to (3.17) is simple if it solves (3.17) independently of the precise values of
the economic data     As the tax authority is unlikely to know these values, or
at least to set taxes conditional on them, a simple solution is administratively convenient.
Now consider the steady state. Then,  = 1 and therefore (3.17) becomes¡
1 +  ¡ ¢ = 1 + (1¡  )( ¡ (1 +  )) (3.18)
By inspection, the only simple solution to (3.18) is   =   = 0 The result that the interest
income tax is zero is of course, the classic result of Chamley(1986) and Judd(1985); our
new result is that the rate of tax on …nancial services should be zero. So, we have proved:
Proposition 4. At the steady state, the only simple tax system is where the tax on
interest income,   and the tax on …nancial intermediation services,   are both zero.
Two comments can be made here. First, away from the steady state,   = 

 = 0
is generally not optimal. So, Proposition 4 - along with Proposition 6 below - makes
precise the conditions under which the result of the existing literature that savings inter-
mediation should not be taxed generalizes to a second-best environment; zero taxation of
intermediation services requires (a) unrestricted taxation of pro…t, and (b) a steady state.
Second, the celebrated result of Chamley(1986) and Judd(1985) that in the steady state,
the tax on capital income is zero does not hold precisely in our model, as the planner
has an additional tax instrument,    However, zero taxation of capital emerges if we also
impose administrative simplicity.
4. Less than Full Taxation of Pure Pro…t
Recall that we have to assume that …rms have decreasing returns, because they face
di¤erent costs of capital. Therefore, they generate pure pro…t. So far, we have made
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the strong assumption that 100% taxation of this pro…t is possible for the government.
However, is well-known that this is a key assumption behind the classical Diamond-
Mirrlees result that inputs are not taxed at the second-best optimum. Here, we investigate
to what extent our results generalize to the more realistic case where pure pro…t cannot
be taxed at 100%. Ideally, we should model this via some kind of incentive constraint
for managers or entrepreneurs that constrains a pro…t tax. However, that is beyond the
scope of this paper, and following a large literature in tax design, we just assume that the
pro…t tax is  is …xed at some   1.
The main change to the tax design problem is that now post-tax pro…t appears in
the budget constraint of the household. This post-tax pro…t can be written as (1¡ )
where  is aggregate pre-tax pro…t:
 =
P
=1
(  ¡   ¡  ) (4.1)
and so income in period  is now +(1+ )+(1¡  ) It can then be checked that
 also appears in the implementability constraint as follows:
1X
=0
( +  ( + (1¡ ))) = 0 (4.2)
From (4.1), and the fact that  =   we see that  only depends on 

 

  =
1  So, the only …rst-order conditions to the tax design problem that change are (3.8),
(3.9). They change to:


 + (1¡  )
()

=  + 


  = 1  (4.3)


 + (1¡  )
()

=    = 1  (4.4)
The …rst question is whether aggregate production e¢ciency holds i.e. whether  = 1
It is easy to check17 that ()

 ()

cannot be written   

 respectively for
some common constant  This implies that we cannot conclude that it is optimal to have
(3.13) holding at the tax optimum. This implies in turn, that we can no longer show that
  should be fully deductible i.e. 
 = 1 This is not surprising: generally, without 100%
taxation of pro…t, and heterogenous …rms, it is well-known that aggregate production
e¢ciency does not hold.
17This can be seen from the fact that  depends on  

 via the term (
 ¡  ))  ¡ ;
di¤erentiation of the latter with respect to  

 generate expressions that are not commonly proportional
to   

  even for special cases such as the Cobb-Douglas.
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But, with one …rm, the question of whether the e¢cient allocation of capital across
…rms does not arise. So, to look at the key question of the optimal rate for    we assume
just one …rm, so that we can abstract from the question of whether   can be deductible
from …rm costs. In fact, without loss of generality we can assume full deductibility, so the
cost of capital for the single …rm is ~ = +  where we replace  by  to emphasize
that there is now a single …rm. In this case, we can prove the following analogue of
Proposition 3. The proof follows the proof of Proposition 3 closely, except that conditions
(4.3),(4.4) replace (3.8),(3.9), and is thus omitted18.
Proposition 5. At all dates  = 1 2    

 solve

¡
1 +  ¡  +
¢
= 1 + (1¡   )( ¡ (1 +  )) (4.5)
where  is de…ned in Proposition 3, and
 = (1¡  ) 1
1 +
µ
 ¡ 

¶µ
( +  )
()

¡ ()

¶
Note that if 100% pro…t taxation is available i.e.  = 1 then (4.5) reduces to (3.17).
As before,    

 are not uniquely determined from this single condition. However, we can
proceed as above, by focussing on a solution where the interest income tax and the spread
tax are equal. Assume a steady state, so that  = 1. Also, assume that the two taxes
are equal19 i.e.   =  (1 +  ) Substituting this into (4.5) gives
 
1 +  
=   = (1¡ ) 1
1 +
µ
 ¡ 

¶


µ
()

¡ ( + )()

¶
(4.6)
This is quite an intuitive formula. First, when 100% pro…t taxation is available i.e.  = 1,
it reduces to   =   = 0 consistently with Proposition 4. Second,   is non-zero only
when it is socially desirable to tax more i.e. ¡

 0 Third, without transactions costs,
the sign of   is the same as the sign of
()


The intuition is as follows. If taxation is distortionary at the margin the government
would like to tax pro…t (more), as it is a non-distortionary source of tax revenue; more
precisely, it would like to reduce  as this relaxes the implementability constraint.
It cannot do this directly. However, if a reduction in  reduces  this can be done
indirectly via taxing capital income. This is in line with results in Stiglitz and Das-
gupta(1971) for the case of a static (one-period) economy. It is also similar to Correia
18It is available on request.
19The spread tax is expressed as a percentage of the cost of intermediation services, gross of the tax,
and thus must be divided through by 1 +  to make it comparable to 
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(1996), who shows, in the context of the Chamley model, that if an untaxed (or incom-
pletely taxed) third factor of production is complementary to capital in the production
function, then capital income should be taxed positively20. With transactions costs, an
additional term ¡( +  )()

is added. Fourth, taking the ratio of 

1+
in (4.6), and

1+
in (3.12), and cancelling the common factor 1
1+
³
¡

´
 we can see that   and  
will di¤er, although we cannot say generally which will be larger.
To get a feel for when   will be positive, consider two cases. First, suppose that the
production function is linear in labour, i.e.  ( ) =  () +  Then, in this case, it is
easily checked that  =  ()¡  0() so
()

¡ ( + )()

= ¡ 00()  0
and so the interest income tax and spread tax are both positive. On the other hand, if
the production function is Cobb-Douglas i.e.  ( ) =   +   1 then  =
(1¡  ¡ ) so
()

¡ ( +  )()

= ¡( + )(1¡ ¡ )  0
and so the interest income tax and spread tax are both negative. To summarize:
Proposition 6. Assume just one …rm, and that the economy is in the steady state. Then,
an optimal tax scheme is to tax interest income and …nancial intermediation services at
the same rate given by (4.6). This common tax can be positive or negative, depending on
the properties of the production function.
5. Other Extensions
5.1. Unitary Taxation of Wage and Capital Income
Another interesting special case is where there is unitary taxation of wage and capital
income. This is relevant because in practice, many countries tax wage and non-wage
income in a unitary way, according to a single progressive schedule21. In this simple
20The exact conditions for   0 are somewhat di¤erent here to Correia(1996), as we assume that the
third factor of production, which gives rise to pure pro…t, it is …xed supply, whereas in Correia(1996),
it is in elastic supply. The latter assumption imposes an additional implementability contrsaint on the
optimal tax problem.
21A well-known exception here is the the dual income tax system which levies a proportional tax rate
on all net income (capital, wage and pension income less deductions) combined with progressive tax rates
on gross labour and pension income. The dual income tax was …rst implemented in the four Nordic
countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) through a number of tax reforms from 1987 to 1993.
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model, with linear taxes, unitary taxation of income simply means taxing both wage and
capital income at the same rate. Here, there is no explicit wage income tax; it is implicitly
de…ned via the budget constraint via  =

1+
 That is, if the government replaced a
consumption tax at rate   by a wage income tax at rate

1+
the real equilibrium in the
model would be unchanged. So, with unitary taxation ( = 

 ), we can replace 1 ¡  
by 1
1+
in (3.17) to get:
(1 +  )
¡
1 +  ¡ 
¢
= 1 +   + ( ¡ (1 +  )) (5.1)
This is most easily analyzed in the steady state when  = 1 Then, (5.1) can be easily
solved for   to give the following result:
Proposition 7. Suppose that there is unitary taxation of wage and non-wage income.
Then, at the steady state, optimal taxes     satisfy
  =
h
1¡ 

i
    
So, we see that with unitary income taxation, the tax rate on intermediation services
is proportional to the tax on consumption, but is at a lower rate, and could be negative.
5.2. Endogenizing Savings Intermediation Services
We have, so far, treated the service of savings intermediation by banks in rather ”black
box” fashion. In particular, we have treated  the amount of intermediation services per
unit of capital supplied to …rm , as exogenous. However, it is clear that banks supply
several di¤erent kinds of intermediation services, notably liquidity services (Diamond and
Dybvig(1983)), and monitoring services (Diamond (1991), Besanko and Kanatas(1993),
Holmstrom and Tirole(1997)).
In this version of the paper, we do not attempt provide a fully microfounded version of
these kinds of intermediation services, for several reasons. First, it is technically di¢cult
to embed some explicit models of intermediation services into the dynamic optimal tax
framework. Second, the payo¤ from doing so in terms of increased insights is not really
proportionate to the increased complexity. In the end, bank intermediation activity, when
explicitly modelled, may (or may not) have spillovers on the rest of the economy. If there
are spillovers, then the optimal tax is a Piguovian one to internalise these spillovers.
Ultimately, this is because the government can use the interest income tax to control the
household’s marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption, and
so any tax on intermediation services is a free instrument which can be used to internalize
externalities arising from bank activity.
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These general points are illustrated in a previous version of the paper, Lockwood(2010),
where  is interpreted as the level of bank monitoring, along the lines of Holmstrom and
Tirole(1997). In their framework, without monitoring, bank lending to …rms is impossi-
ble, because the informational rent they demand is so high that the residual return to the
bank does not cover the cost of capital. So, as monitoring is costly, the socially e¢cient
level of monitoring is that level which just induces to bank to lend. In the case where
the bank is competitive, i.e. where …rm chooses the terms of the loan contract subject
to a break-even constraint for the bank, an assumption commonly made in the …nance
literature, this is also the equilibrium level of monitoring. In this case, savings interme-
diation should not be taxed, because doing to will violate production e¢ciency, as in the
case with heterogenous …rms and a …xed amount of intermediation services per unit of
savings. But, in the case where the bank is a monopolist i.e. it chooses the contract, it
will generally choose a higher level of monitoring than this, in order to reduce the …rm’s
informational rent. So, in this case, the optimal tax is a positive Pigouvian tax, set to
internalize this negative externality.
6. Conclusions
This paper has considered the optimal taxation of …nancial intermediation services in
a dynamic economy, when the government can also use wage and capital income taxes.
The objective of this paper has been to take a fresh look at this question, from a tax
design point of view. We set up and solve the tax design problem in a dynamic general
equilibrium model of the Chamley(1986) type, where the government chooses taxes savings
intermediation, as well as the usual taxes on consumption (or equivalently, wage income)
and income from capital, to …nance a public good, and where …nancial intermediaries, in
the form of banks, are explicitly modelled.
Our main …nding is that at the steady state, the only administratively simple optimal
tax structure is to set the tax rate on …nancial intermediation services equal to the tax
rate on capital income. When 100% pro…t taxation is available, this common rate is zero;
in the more realistic case of less than 100% pro…t taxation, this common rate can be
positive or negative, and is generally di¤erent from the optimal tax on consumption.
There are several obvious limitations of the analysis. The …rst and most fundamental,
is that the role of banks is not microfounded. This is clearly a topic for future work:
some preliminary results in this direction are described in Section 5.2. The second is
the restriction to linear income taxation. The classic result of Atkinson and Stiglitz tells
us that with non-linear income taxation, commodity taxation is redundant, and more
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recently, Golosov et. al. (2003) has recently shown that this result generalizes to a
dynamic economy. Their result would apply, for example, in a version of our model where
households di¤er in skill levels, and without any …nancial intermediation. It is a topic for
future work to introduce …nancial intermediation in this environment.
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A. Appendix
Proof that  ¸ 0 Suppose to the contrary that   0 at the optimum. Then, as
  0  · 0   0 from (3.10). So, from (3.10),
 = (1 + (1 +))   (A.1)
But from (3.5),(3.7), (3.9), (2.8):
¡ =   =   =  (A.2)
So, combining (A.1), (A.2), we see that
  ¡ (A.3)
But, (A.3) says that utility could be increased if 1$ of spending on the public good were
returned to the household as a lump-sum, contradicting the optimality of the policy. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. From (3.4), (3.5), (3.9),(2.8), we have
¡

= ¡

1 + (1 +)
1 + (1 +)
=

 
=
1
 
=
1

(A.4)
And, from (2.3),(2.4):
¡

=
1 +  

(A.5)
So, combining (A.4), (A.5), we get, after some rearrangement:
 
1 +  
=
( ¡ )
1 + (1 +)
(A.6)
Also, from (A.2), we have:
¡ = ¡(1 + (1 +)) = 
which implies
 =
1
1 +
 ¡ 

  = ¡

(A.7)
Combining (A.6),(A.7) to eliminate  and rearranging, we get (3.12) as required. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. From (3.4), (3.11), we get
¡1¡1

=
1
 ~
¡1

=
¡1

(A.8)
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where ~ =
(1+(1+))
(1+(1+¡1))
. Next, using (4.3),(4.4) to eliminate   

 in (3.6), and also
using (3.7), we get


 ¡   = ¡1 +   (A.9)
So, then from (A.9),
¡1

= (  ¡  ( + )) (A.10)
= (
 
 
¡ ( + ))
But now, from (2.8) and (3.15) with  = 1 we also have
 
 
=
1 + 

+  (A.11)
Combining (A.10) and (A.11) gives
¡1
 
= (
1 + 

¡ ) (A.12)
Next, combining (A.12) and (A.8), we get:
¡1

=  ~(
1 + 

¡ ) (A.13)
Finally, from (2.3),(2.5), (2.8), we get:
¡1

= (1 + )
1 +  ¡1
1 +  
(A.14)
= 
¡
1 + (1¡   )( ¡ (1 +  
¢
)
1 +  ¡1
1 +  
Combining (A.13), (A.14), and eliminating ¡1

 we get
(
1 + 

¡ ) = 1 + (1¡   )( ¡ (1 +  )) (A.15)
where  = ~
1+
1+¡1
= (1+(1+))
(1+(1+¡1))
1+
1+¡1
as required. ¤
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